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AGROTERRORISM—WHY WE’RE NOT READY

Agroterrorism—
Why We’re Not Ready:
A Look at the Role of Law Enforcement
Terrorists seeking to strike a
blow at the U.S. economy
need look no further than
the Nation’s heartland for a
“soft” target. An agroterrorist
attack could dramatically im
pact many aspects of Ameri
can life, including local law
enforcement, which—
especially in rural areas—is
financially and strategically
unprepared to respond.

This Research for Policy is
based on “Defining Law
Enforcement’s Role in
Protecting American
Agriculture from Agroter
rorism,” by Terry Knowles,
James Lane, Gary Bayens,
Nevil Speer, Jerry Jaax,
David Carter, and Andra
Bannister, final report to
the National Institute of
Justice, December 2005,
NCJ 212280, available at
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/212280.pdf.

Agricultural experts say that
today they are most con
cerned about the intentional
introduction of foot-and
mouth disease (FMD) into
the food supply. Twenty
times more infectious than
smallpox, FMD causes pain
ful blisters on the tongues,
hooves, and teats of clovenhoofed animals (like cows,
pigs, goats, and deer), ren
dering them unable to walk,
be milked, eat, and drink.
Although people generally
cannot contract FMD, they
can carry the virus in their
lungs up to 48 hours and
transmit it to animals. The
animal-to-animal airbornetransmission range of FMD
is 50 miles.

The introduction of FMD in
the United States—with its
generally open and difficultto-protect farms, fields, and
feedlots—would require the
mass slaughter of animals
and the disposal of potential
ly millions of animal carcass
es. It could halt the domestic
and international sale of
meat and meat products for
months or even years. Based
on the FMD outbreak in the
United Kingdom in 2001, re
searchers estimate that an
attack against the American
livestock industry could cost
taxpayers up to $60 billion.1

Who Would Lead
the Response?
Many believe that public
health officials would lead the
response to an agroterrorism
attack, but this might not be
the case. The laws of most
States require that such an
event be handled as a crime
scene investigation, giving
law enforcement primary
responsibility. Ill-equipped
to handle the magnitude of
responsibilities that would
1
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follow an act of agroterror
ism, local police departments
would be pushed to the limit.

This 21-month study was
conducted through a part
nership among the Kansas
Bureau of Investigation,
the Ford County (Kansas)
Sheriff’s Department, and
the National Agriculture
Biosecurity Center at
Kansas State University;
findings were based, in
part, on field surveys and
interviews with law
enforcement, livestock
producers, meat packers,
truckers, feedlot
managers, researchers,
politicians, and animal
health officials. The
research also included
two agroterrorist simula
tion exercises in Kansas.
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Research points to the first
priority of local law enforce
ment after an agroterrorist
attack: establishing and en
forcing a 6-mile radius quar
antine (113 square miles)
around the point of origin
to control the spread of the
virus. The second priority
would be to set up state
wide roadblocks to enforce
stop-movement orders.
Such a tremendous effort—
requiring that all vehicles
coming into or going out
of the impacted State be
stopped and inspected—
would require a coordinated
response by local, State,
and Federal officials.

Evidence, including tissue
from infected animals, would
have to be collected. All
cloven-hoofed animals (both
domestic and wild) within the
affected area would have to
be destroyed and disposed
of. A full-scale criminal inves
tigation would have to be
launched, including the identi
fication, apprehension, and
prosecution of suspects.

Preventing an Attack
Because terrorists rely on a
lack of preparedness, law
enforcement agencies should
start now to develop a plan
for preventing an agroterror
ism attack—and the interrup
tion of basic services, civil
and emotional stress, and
public health concerns that

In May 2006, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) held a regional
planning meeting on preventing and responding to a bioterrorism attack
on the Nation’s agriculture industry. The meeting—which grew out of
NIJ’s research on defining the role of law enforcement in protecting
American agriculture from bioterrorism—brought together key law
enforcement, animal health, and homeland security officials from nine
Midwestern States.
Officials rated their State’s preparedness in preventing an agroterrorism
attack and discussed ways to improve the response, should an attack
occur. One of the most vital topics concerned coordination among law
enforcement and veterinary and animal health authorities, within the
State and across State borders.
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likely would follow. On the local
level, law enforcement agencies
bear a responsibility for intelli
gence gathering, including the
review of Federal reports on
bioterrorism threats. For exam
ple, in an effort to minimize the
potential of an epidemic, the
World Organization on Animal
Health coordinates information
on animal diseases (see www.
oie.int). Local jurisdictions are
also in the best position to con
duct vulnerability studies of
area farms and feedlots.
Specialized training for law
enforcement is needed.
Joint planning and opera
tional exercises also must
take place for agencies
to be ready to respond to
such a crime, if it occurs.
Partnerships—the best way
to prevent an agroterrorism
attack and the only way
to contain one—must be

created among local farmers,
truckers, feedlot owners, and
other critical members of the
food-supply chain. A working
relationship between criminal
investigators and veterinari
ans and animal and plant
health inspectors must be
established.

A New Security
Paradigm
The paradigm for protecting
the Nation’s food supply
changed after 9/11, focus
ing attention on areas that
require greater security mea
sures. Research funded by
NIJ recommends that, to pro
tect the Nation’s 2.1 million
farms, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA), the
U.S. Department of Home
land Security (DHS), and
other intelligence-gathering

The Ford County Sheriff’s Department in Dodge City, Kansas, in collabo
ration with the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, developed a neighbor
hood watch/community policing program called Agro-Guard. Law
enforcement and livestock producers participate in the program in an
effort to identify threats to agriculture before they become incidents.
Agro-Guard participation involves reporting suspicious activity, posting
warning signs, holding community meetings on law enforcement and
animal health issues, creating a public-access Web site, and develop
ing emergency response procedures.
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agencies work with local and
State law enforcement and
the livestock industry to
develop a national plan to
prevent, respond to, and
ultimately recover from an
incident of agroterrorism.

Notes
1. See Economic Impact of
a Foreign Animal Disease
(FAD) Outbreak Across the
United States, U.S. Depart
ment of Agriculture, Wash
ington, DC, 2004.

Additional Reading
Chalk, P. (2004). Hitting
America’s soft underbelly:
The threat of deliberate
biological attacks against
the U.S. agriculture and
food industry. Santa Monica,
CA: RAND.
Jaax, J. (2002, August 20).
Sworn Testimony: How
effectively is the federal

government assisting state
and local governments in
preparing for a biological,
chemical, or nuclear attack?
Congressional field hearing,
House Committee on Gov
ernment Reform, Abilene, KS
(http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.
cgi?IPadress=162.140.64.88
&filename=88193.wais&direc
tory=/diskc/wais/data/107_
house_hearings).
RAND. (2003). Agroterrorism:
What is the threat and what
can be done about it? Santa
Monica, CA: National
Defense Research Institute.
Waters, A. (2005, May 3).
Foot and mouth disease out
break in Great Britain: A case
study. Formal presentation,
International Symposium on
Agroterrorism, Kansas City,
MO (www.fbi-isa.org/library/
Waters_files/frame.htm).

The researchers’ recommendations for strengthening America’s
defense against agroterrorism include:

4

■

Development of a national law enforcement plan, including
Federal funding of preventive measures to be developed by local
law enforcement.

■

Intelligence-gathering by local law enforcement, including com
munity policing in conjunction with the agriculture industry.

■

Training, at the regional level, of local law enforcement personnel
to enforce stop-movement orders and quarantine areas in the
event of an attack.

The National Institute of Justice is the
research, development, and evaluation
agency of the U.S. Department of Justice.
NIJ’s mission is to advance scientific research,
development, and evaluation to enhance the
administration of justice and public safety.
Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
This research was supported by the National Institute of
Justice under grant number 2003–IJ–CX–1024.
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